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CHAPTER VI

Calvinism and Higher Education

[NOTE 1]

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I

THAT commitment to Christianity entails responsibility for Christian action also in the realm of higher education is to the contemporary American Protestant no novel doctrine. Indeed, he not only recognizes this responsibility, but has long reduced to two the possible directions which such action can take; either promotion of a Christian college (in its origin usually denominational), or insistence that at the state educational institutions attention be paid to religion. Nor does the one course of action exclude the other.

Traditional Promotion of Religion at State Colleges

These alternatives for contemporary Protestant action are both rooted in our history.

The idea that religion be not neglected at publicly supported colleges, anemic as the idea in its contemporary form may be, can trace its lineage back to husky, though very indifferent, colonial times; straight back to the beginnings of Harvard in an enactment of the General Court of the Colony in 1636. The mind of the founders is unmistakably stated in an account that dates back to 1643:

After God had carried us safe to New England and we had builded our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, rear'd convenient places for God's worship, and settled the civil government, one of the next things we longed for and looked after was to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate ministry, to the churches when our present ministers shall lie in the dust.

And the rules (1642) of Harvard include the following canon:

Let every student be plainly instructed, and earnestly pressed to consider well, the maine end of his life and studies is, *to know God and Jesus Christ which is eternall life*, John 17:3, and therefore to lay Christ in the bottome, as the only foundation of all sound knowledge and learning.

This demand that in its aim a state college be Christian, makes sense in a theocracy. Making sense of the demand as the distance from theocracy

NOTE 1

In the United States the term *higher education* has come to mean college education and such further education as presupposes a college degree; it means education on the college and university levels.

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increased, was to become a disturbing problem; but the demand has always persisted.

Traditional Promotion of Independent Christian Colleges

And as for the alternative idea of contemporary Protestantism, the idea that Christian action with reference to higher education calls for the establishment and maintenance of non-state, professedly Christian colleges, it is an idea that had taken firm root already a hundred years ago. The large number of such institutions that sprang, up in the middle quarters of the nineteenth century was the result not only of geographical and economic factors, and of the rapid expansion of our country, nor only of denominational exclusiveness; it was also the expression of Protestant Christian reaction to the increasing secularization of the state and, in consequence, of state education. [NOTE 2]

But No Vigorous Traditional Definition of Christian Higher Education

A sense of responsibility for Christian action with regard to higher education, and also the persuasion that such action can take two directions, American Protestantism inherited from the past. But what it did not inherit is even more significant. To the question, Precisely and concretely what is Christian education on the college level? It inherited no animated answer; no answer with a will of its own.

At Harvard in seventeenth century Massachusetts, the question hardly arose; the answer seemed automatic. The educational pattern of a Christian college was assumed to be that of Cambridge University in the mother country. There was need in the colony for a trained ministry; and, in keeping with medieval and Reformation thought and practice, such meant a, ministry educated in the liberal arts as well as in theology. This primary function of training ministers, together with the inherited educational pattern and the Protestant ethos prevailing in colonial days, seemed sufficient to guarantee and in large measure to define, the Christian character of education in the early college.

But during the eighteenth century when religion was no longer considered basic to morals, and when the theory of the union of church and state had long been left behind, Protestants continued no less comfortably to believe that the question, What makes higher education Christian? answered itself. The typical curriculum remained a traditional liberal arts program. The atmosphere in the college was that of the prevalent Protestant Christianity. Science and philosophy might be loose from theology, but independently they still supported the Christian faith; church and state might be separate, but largely this fact was only formally significant; all reasonable men continued to believe in Deity. In such circumstances, what need of a deliberate and autonomous definition of Christian education?

NOTE 2

A secularization which, paradoxically, Protestantism itself encouraged.

Nor does it appear that the founders of the denominational colleges in the nineteenth century felt the need of independent diagnostic thinking, on Christian premises, about the educational pattern of the Christian college. Training of a ministry once again became primary function; for subject matter the denominational colleges took over the existing curriculum; as independent of the state they felt wholly free to emphasize the cultivation of personal evangelical Christian life; the faculty were devout. And the combination of such elements was presumed to answer the question, What makes education Christian?

Historically, American Protestantism had not felt challenged to vigorous, independent definition of Christian education.

Radical Changes in American Life

However, toward the close of the nineteenth century, American Protestantism was startled to discover that the apparently innocent changes which had taken place since 1620 had completely transformed the educational map. The old landmarks were gone. Orientation was bewilderingly different. Egalitarian democracy was now condemning the liberal arts curriculum as an outworn pattern that had been cut to fit an intellectual aristocracy of ministers and vocational scholars. The traditional respect for learning had been superseded by the demand that education be "practical"; the student was to be given freedom to elect such courses as seemed to himself most useful. The ancient languages came under heavy fire. The humanities were asked to make more and more room for the new science. And in scientific thinking, biological and more particularly the "new" evolutionistic categories had supplanted the mechanistic, with which the Protestant apologete had come to feel at home. Traditional Protestant ethics no longer exercised its old compulsion on American life. Worst of all, Protestant Christianity itself was no longer united on the basic interpretation of Christian faith; the fundamentals of Christianity were in dispute within the Protestant denominations themselves.

Traditional Christian Education Challenged

For answer to the question, What makes a Christian college? American Protestantism had leaned heavily on traditions and factors and forces which no longer prevailed. Now it suddenly found itself in a strange country, among people who spoke in a strange new tongue, demanding a sign. It was challenged to show why a college professing to be Christian should be preferred by a Christian student above a state university, professedly neutral. Was not the typical Christian college a small school, and always in poverty? Were not its teachers underpaid and overloaded, and consequently mere uninspired, unscholarly recitationists? Were not its president and trustees provincial and bigoted? Were not its laboratories bare of equipment; its course offerings few and barnacled; was not its library a haphazard collection of motley and moldy donations from the

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attics of superannuated ministers? By contrast, was not the typically professedly neutral university a progressive and expanding institution which attracted the country's best scholars to its staff, which had wellfurnished laboratories and libraries, and which provided a wide and a democratically varied array of courses? And though the state university was not Christian, neither was it anti-Christian; was it not neutral? And, after all, is not chemistry chemistry, wherever it is taught, and history history, and knowledge knowledge? Is not the subject-matter of college education the same whether in a Christian or neutral institution? Should the Christian student then be blamed for demanding of the Christian college a sign?

Presidents and other spokesmen replied, in substance, that the Christian college could allege at least three good reasons for existing and for being preferred by Christian youth. In the first place, instead of being a handicap, the smallness of the Christian college was an advantage; relations between faculty and students could be the more intimate; the individual student was not lost in the crowd. And even the limited number of course offerings was no hindrance, since, in the second place, the Christian college meant to be the stronghold of liberal arts and of traditional humanistic education. Finally, the Christian college was professedly Christian. True, subject matter is neutral

with the exception of doctrines like that of evolution, but at the Christian college the teachers were professing Christians; religious exercises were still compulsory; students were required to pursue courses in Bible and were not exposed to scientific teachings that endangered their faith; seniors were taught Christian Evidences; there was opportunity outside the curriculum for personal Christian witness and edification.

Such earlier reply only played into the hand of the challenger. If a college, in order to be Christian, had to minimize and even ignore the new science and had to defend an antiquated and aristocratic liberal arts curriculum, could it rightly claim to be scholarly, to be a college? and to be serving democracy? And as for Christian atmosphere -- Bible study, religious exercises, personal Christianity, and the like -- was an independent Christian college necessary to meet this admitted need? In the new situation ought not Protestant action concentrate on promoting religion at the state institutions? -- not, of course, to interfere with their neutrality, but to insure noncompulsory provision for the religious needs of the students. Why not, for example, establish non-credit courses in religion and Bible at (or even in) the neutral state universities? And why not encourage the voluntary organization by like-minded students, of prayer meetings or of Student Volunteer groups? Was there not the Y.M.C.A.? And were there not the local churches representing various denominations? Could not student religious centers be provided at these? In sum, since education is admittedly neutral, and since, though of no less importance than

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education, religion is according to Protestant conviction personal, and a matter of the heart and conscience, why not provide for the supplementary cultivation of religious life right at the university campus?

Apparent Dilemma of Christian Education

The Christian college seemed involved in a fatal dilemma. If, obstinately insisting on the traditional definitions and educational patterns, it elected to continue identifying Christian education and liberal arts, then it condemned

itself as unscholarly as well as undemocratic; as outmoded and not alive to the new learning and to contemporary needs. If, on the other hand, it elected to become scientific and scholarly and to be abreast of the times, then it seemed to lose its reason for independent existence, since a "Christian atmosphere" could as well be provided at the state university. The only way out of the apparent dilemma lay in a vigorous and articulate statement of the perennially differentiating nature of Christian education. American Protestantism had inherited the Christian college, but no such vigorous and articulate statement.

The Typical Christian College of Today

Resigning itself to the dilemma, the typical Christian college of today has either subordinated its Christianity to scholarship, or has minimized scholarship while trying to maintain its Christianity. In the effort to be a real college, it has forgotten to be Christian, or else in attempting to be Christian it has forgotten to be a real college. In either instance the typical Christian college has permitted the avowedly secular institutions to set the educational pattern. The religiously liberal Christian college has followed such leadership because committed to the same basic premises; the religiously orthodox, because it had no vital organizing and patterning principle of its own. Possessing no such architectonic positive principle, even the orthodox college was content to reduce the Christian element in higher education to Christian "atmosphere," together with at most a negative criticism here and there of offensive popular doctrines (Darwinianism, for example) or an ignoring of such topics.

Thus, the typical Christian college has followed the lead of state universities, in "lowering" entrance requirements, adopting survey courses, building a heterogeneous curriculum as far as finances allowed, using objective tests, introducing counseling, permitting free election by the student, subject to "group requirements"; indeed, what has it not taken over? Conceivably, its pattern should be such as to include all this and all else; but at present its pattern is what it is, not because the Christian college knew exactly what place it should assign to prevalent needs and demands, simply because it had

no educational criterion of its own. And the statement holds no less for the typical orthodox college than for the typical liberal.

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Protestant Concessions to Modernity

Contemporary American Protestantism has retained a sense of responsibility for Christian action in the realm of higher education. Furthermore, it knows of two directions which such action can take; either the maintaining of facilities for Christian instruction or edification at or near a state college, or (often additionally and without profound conviction) the maintaining of an inherited Christian college. Action in either direction, if it is to be resolute and significant, presupposes articulate thinking about the relation of Christianity to education; ultimately presupposes a definition of Christian education, and a definition that has a will of its own. But when the changes in American life that had been accumulating since the early theocratic days finally forced on Protestantism the challenge to produce such a definition, the attempts to define Christian education were confused, irresolute, dilemmatic. The cause of this confusion and irresolution is to be sought not in external historical events, but in American Protestantism itself. A virile notion of Christian education requires first a virile notion of Christianity itself; and this American Protestantism no longer supplied. The cause of its inability to meet head-on the challenge of modern education lies in Protestantism's compliant concessions to modernity; lies in its agreement with modernity in the assumption, to suggest an example, that basically Christianity is purely private, subjective, and a matter of the "heart" only.

II

Protestant Readiness to Reject Theocracy Wholesale Unfortunate

In the days of New England theocracy, Protestantism was conscious of no difficulty in defining Christian responsibility with reference to higher education; and in a theocracy, little difficulty would be experienced today.

And it could be more than historical coincidence that the difficulty increased with the distance from theocracy.

But American Protestantism long ago acquired the habit of dismissing New England theocracy and all that went with it as unqualified error.

Contemporary Protestantism, whether Liberal or Fundamentalistic, disavows all connection with what it is certain was a wholly indefensible attempt to revert to Old Testament outlook and practice. Not Protestantism, it protests, but morbid Puritanism is responsible for the theocratic ideal; the spirit of healthy Protestantism, it proclaims, is rather to be sought in Roger Williams, in the separation of Church and State, in the idea that religion is wholly a matter of private conscience.

Now granted that Puritanism is morbid, and granted that Protestantism is right in not seeking to establish theocracy in America today, the conclusion is not yet immediately warranted that about or underlying the idea of theocracy there is nothing representative of true Protestant Christianity. Indeed, it is possible that Protestant inability with vigor and independence

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to define Christian education is not unrelated to Protestant readiness to ridicule theocracy and everything about it, and to identify itself with modern individualism.

Rejected Therewith was also an Important Christian Concept

For, however artificial his theocracy may appear in today's perspective, the Puritan was therein nonetheless seeking to make practically articulate a concept which is centrally significant to Christianity. Whatever his errors, he had at least not surrendered this concept, which is no less characteristic of the New Testament than of the Old; which is an essential component of the Christian thinking of Augustine, of the Middle Ages, of the Reformation, and of classic historic Christianity generally. And, on the other hand, this concept American Protestantism has since his day blurred, and in its classic meaning

discarded along with Puritan theocracy. The concept is that of the Kingdom of God, of the *civitas dei*.

As the concept of *civitas dei*, or kingdom of God, functions in orthodox historic Christian thinking, it is interlocked with the whole framework of Christian thought and life. The concept borrows meaning from, and in its turn contributes meaning to, the Christian doctrine of creation, the definition of man, the plan of salvation, the nature of Christian morality, the significance of culture, the meaning of the gospel, the destiny of man, the glorification of God. While engaged in gradually emptying this concept of its classic Christian meaning, American Protestantism was in the same measure capitulating to modernity; and in the measure that it was increasingly surrendering to modernity and modernity's notions of education, American Protestantism had necessarily to surrender the Christian concept of the *civitas dei* and the Christian definition of education.

Importance of the Concept for Defining Christian Education

The term "kingdom of God" is, of course, still in use; but the Protestant who uses the term has typically first accommodated his thinking to modernity, and has thus blurred the concept and emptied it of its essence. This renders painless his wholesale rejection of theocracy and of the theocratic solution of the educational problem. But the same blurring and devitalizing of this historic Christian concept is also primary cause of the confusion and irresolution which characterize contemporary Protestantism's action in the realm of higher education.

Thus, and by contrast, had a Protestant who, though no Puritan theocrat, nevertheless yielded nothing of the classic meaning of the concept of *civitas dei*, been confronted with the question with which modernity challenged Christian education in the latter nineteenth century: Why should not the Christian be happy with higher education at a professedly neutral institution? He would not have restricted his justification of the Christian college to citing the advantages of smallness, of a liberal arts curriculum, of provision for courses in Bible and for the controverting of scattered erroneous teachings

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and for personal witness, edification, and worship. Such considerations, he would have said, worthy as they may be, do not yet get at the root of the matter. The root of the problem of the Christian's responsibility in education, he would have insisted, cannot be exposed without employing the concept of *civitas* or kingdom. And he would have met the challenge of modern education by contending that education is always education by some kingdom and for citizenship in some kingdom, whether of the world or of God; by contending that between these kingdoms there is opposition, conflict, antithesis; in this sense that no education is neutral; and hence that as citizens of the *civitas dei* Christians can be well served only by education deliberately 'intended for such citizens and continuously patterned by the aim to "lay Christ in the bottom" of all life.

By Contemporary Education Considered Superfluous and Irrelevant

To the contemporary mind such a reply to its challenge sounds at worst like senile irrelevance; at best, like ignorance of modern education. Just what would such an unyielding Protestant (his general type is well represented by a man like Abraham Kuyper) mean by his concept *civitas dei*, or kingdom of God, or divine state, or whatever he chooses to call it? Despite his disclaimer, is he not still talking the archaic language of the old theocracy? Ignorant of modern times and of modern education, is he not turning the clock back to an early New England with room for orthodox Protestants of his own stamp only? Take his notion of "antithesis"; is he perhaps so uninformed as to suppose that modern education is necessarily committed to some anti-Christian philosophy of materialism or naturalism? or that it assumes man is only an animal? Or, since the contemporary mind experiences no need of the concept of *civitas* in the basic, framework of its educational thinking, does he in his ignorance perhaps conclude that therefore modern educational philosophy has no place for morals and religion? or recognizes no "antithesis," if he likes the term?

If our unyielding Protestant is vitally and meaningfully to meet the challenge of modern education, he should do more than simply state that this concept of

civitas was the thing of real value which American Protestantism tossed out along with theocracy, and that the concept is basic to solution of the problem of Christianity and education. He should go on to furnish the contemporary mind with a definition of the concept. And his definition should be pointed not toward theocracy nor toward theology, but informedly and relevantly toward the cultural situation of our day, toward our educational problems and program, toward our contemporary educational principles and underlying philosophy. And in order to insure that the definition will be both informed and relevant, let him postpone it till after he has heard a brief statement of the basic concepts with which the contemporary mind works, concepts like nature and culture. Thereafter let him so define his concept of *civitas* or divine state as to show, if he can, that there is in his concept anything of abiding value and of modern

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applicability, also with regard to morality and Christianity, which has been omitted from contemporary educational philosophy; meanwhile always remembering, of course, that we are talking college and university, not the church and private life.

What Contemporary Mind Means by Nature

First of all the contemporary mind would insist it is so far from being necessarily committed to naturalism or animalism that an indispensable condition for understanding its educational philosophy is recognition of emphatic contrast or opposition between animal and man, between nature and culture.

The term nature has, of course, a variety of meanings. In the present context, nature means to the contemporary mind the world as given; as given not to the individual but to man. That there should be so many stars in the heavens and so many chemical elements in matter; that there should be motion, change, life; that human nature should be biologically and psychologically what it is; that anything should be at all; -- all this is not of man's making or choosing; this is simply given. And the totality of all these existences and

events and processes and forces and laws, as given to mankind, is nature in its contrast with civilization and culture. It is out of this given that man makes culture.

Contemporary Mind on the Difference Between Animal and Man, and on the Meaning of Culture

True, the animal also lives in the world of nature, also modifies nature, and out of nature the animal may also be said to make something. And the contemporary mind would concede that much of man's modification, taken by itself, apparently differs from animal only in degree. Nonetheless, contemporary mind over all would insist that while any animal can modify nature, culture can result only from modification of nature by man as qualitatively different from a mere animal. Man is qualitatively different in that, unlike the, animal, he is aware of rational forms or pure system and has a will to modify nature in accord therewith. Man can know; and his, knowing differs from animal awareness in that man can know pure system, can know system as pure interconnected forms -- mathematical system, for example, or aesthetic; thus he can intellectually enter a world which is closed to the animal. But man can also will; and his willing differs from animal conation in that it is will to culture; that is, is will to create out of nature a world that accords with pure system; thus, in culture, he creates a world into which no mere animal ever enters. Man is an animal, yes. But in his relation, both as knower and as cultural will, to a system which is objective, independent of his private self, and which is not chained to nature, he is wholly unlike the animal. As animal, man is himself part of nature and subject to its given laws; as rational, man is aware of law or system as such, and while he finds something thereof embodied in given

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nature, what he finds is never enough for him as rational. Hence, he creates culture as a richer and more satisfactory embodiment; an embodiment wherein also moral laws ("Thou shalt not steal"; "Keep thy contracts"; "Hold men superior to animals"; "Be gentle"; "Be just"; "Be temperate," etc.)

become articulate, as do the laws of logic and scientific method, the norms of beauty, and the aspirations of religion.

Now, only such rationally creative activity, only such modification of the given, as also expresses man's difference from the animal, is cultural activity; and only the product of such activity is culture.

Thus while nature, including man as animal, enters into cultural activity as the material which is shaped, contemporary mind by no means limits the cultural product to the tangible. Man's clearing of the land, his building of cities and highways and tunnels, his inventing of the wheel and of the steam engine; -- these are activities issuing in palpable products. But products of his will to culture also include language, war, arithmetic, slavery, national debts, life insurance, the credit system, the state and governmental institutions; science, poetry, schools, laws, mores and conventions and taboos and superstitions; religion and churches; -- an endless number of invisible creations. Furthermore, associated and developed with such human creations, visible or invisible, are drives and pressures in which man's will to culture also expresses itself; for example, a pressure toward nationalism, or toward efficiency, or toward "enlightenment," or the kind of thing one means to suggest by a term like *Zeitgeist*. All such things are product of man's rationally creative modification of nature as he exercises his will to make a world in which man as human may feel at home. The totality of such products is culture, in its contrast with given nature.

Contemporary Mind on the Essence of Morality

And this contrast between nature and culture is not merely a contrast of less system and more. For while nature is not without its laws, its laws are non-moral. Nature has in it inertia, and even obstinate resistance to the attenuating and refining process of man's cultural activity. Nature left to itself turns Mayan temples back into jungles, rots our canvases, rusts our bridges; and except for culture, man himself would return to natural savagery and brutishness.

The very essence of moral choice, therefore, is the choice for culture over against nature. Broadly, the good is culture; the bad is uncultured nature; the good will is the will to culture. Honesty, justice, the keeping of contracts, all the virtues, are articulations of what is implicit in the decisive moral choice for culture. Cultural activity and its products are definitive of man as moral being.

Moral Aim of Contemporary Education

For the contemporary mind, all this is full and adequate background for educational thinking and for the essentials of its program. To choose for

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culture is to choose for education; for if, in defiance of nature, the present level of cultural achievement is to be maintained and even raised, education is indispensable. Furthermore, against this background the aim of education is at once apparent; its general purpose is to raise the individual to the full measure of articulated rationality which the culture of his day embodies, and to arouse within the individual the will to culture. The decisive contrast between nature and culture furnishes at one and the same time both dynamic and definition of education. [NOTE 3]

Religion for Contemporary Mind

And against this background, the contemporary mind insists, religion also can come into its own. True, morality is common to all men, and is independent of theology; and this is great gain for morality no less than for education; the university can stay out of sectarian disputes, and yet can inculcate the common essence of all morality, can energize the will to culture. But all this is also gain for religion. Religion is now recognized not as an abnormality or idiosyncrasy, but as itself a cultural product, and a cultural product of a high order; as itself rooted in the will not to be content with nature; as itself expressive of moral aspiration. Religion, too, results from man's will to create a world for himself in which as man he can feel at home. And there is a further gain to religion, which should appeal particularly to the Protestant

whether Liberal or not. Religion is now recognized as something intimate, something personal and private, something left wholly to and in the individual conscience. Religion has to do with the supernatural and supercultural; religion is a matter of a man's private attitudes and feelings on the questions that take us outside this life, questions of God and the hereafter. And if a man but makes the choice in favor of culture, he should be left wholly free in these questions of the heart. Indeed, he should be encouraged to cherish his private convictions; the university has no quarrel with the churches, and welcomes their reinforcement of the will to culture. And from the other side, the Christian's responsibility in higher education is both to get behind higher education as expressing the common will to culture, alongside such higher education to promote religion according to his interpretation of it, whether at a state university or at some denominational college.

The Whole Proposed as Ideal Solution of the Educational Problem for American Protestantism

This, the contemporary mind believes, is a philosophy of education for America in our day, and particularly for Protestant America. It is a philosophy of education which respects the principle of separation of Church and State and, therefore, issues in education which is nonsectarian and neutral, but nonetheless moral and challenging. Contemporary education can

NOTE 3

To define the aim of education as adjustment of the individual to nature and society is simply to reduce the philosophy to more provincial proportions.

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define morality vigorously, and yet so as to appeal to men of every creed. It ties up with no particular religion, and yet serves all. It is scientific and rational, yet not committed to naturalism. It is not theocratic, but democratic; not medieval, but abreast of the times; not formalistic and academic, but practical; not static but dynamic. And the contemporary mind contends that both the underlying philosophy and the educational pattern itself are, as

American Protestants generally have agreed, thoroughly Protestant; not least in the assumption that religion, and specifically Christianity, is wholly a thing of the heart and inner disposition of the individual.

And now, after this exposition of the philosophy which underlies contemporary education and which articulates itself with increasing effectiveness in contemporary educational programs and practice, will our unyielding Protestant still presume to maintain that more need and can be said? Having taken note of the emphatic distinction between nature and culture which is basic to modern "neutral" education, will he not now admit that in this distinction is contained everything of value in his idea of "antithesis," of "opposition between kingdoms"? Will he not now admit, that, far from being un-Christian, contemporary education in its essentials exactly does justice to morals and religion, and without jeopardizing science and scholarship? Indeed, instead of belaboring American Protestantism of today as having failed to cope vigorously and resolutely with the problem of higher education, ought he not rather commend it for formulating the right Protestant solution, making Christianity a matter of private edification against the background of a common will to culture? On this question of relating Christianity to education, does he still think he can suggest any alternative except that of theocracy with its real confusion of State and Church?, Will he still care to attempt a definition of his *civitas*, but then a definition informed, and relevant to the contemporary situation?

If This is All, then Civitas in its Classic Meaning Cannot be Defined

Incontestably, if on the essentials what the contemporary mind has to say about nature and culture and morality and religion is all that need and can be said, then the classic Christian content of *civitas* or spiritual kingdom has lost its distinguishing connotation. If this is all that need be said, then the best we can do for the historic concept is to say that the term spiritual kingdom is only another word for culture in its contrast with nature. Or, if we think this is hardly being fair to its specific character, we can say that kingdom of God is just one more among the many products of cultural activity, taking its place alongside others of the less tangible kind, like quietism or socialism or high-

churchism, But then we shall meanwhile have deprived the concept of *civitas* or spiritual kingdom of all its historic Christian meaning.

And, contrariwise, if the concept is to retain character, if *civitas* is to have anything like its classic meaning, then what the contemporary, mind

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says is not all that needs saying. Then it will have to be said that the kingdom is not to be identified with culture, much less with one of the cultural products, and still less with a set of psychological ideas in the heads of some people. And it will have to be said that the opposition between kingdoms is not to be reduced to the contrast between culture and nature. The definition of *civitas* requires reference beyond culture and nature and their opposition. Modern educational theory is in error, and its error is not simply that of omitting the notion of *civitas*; the framework of modern educational theory is itself that of a *civitas* which is opposed to the *civitas dei*.

III

General Meaning of the Concept of Civitas

Civitas is the articulation in human life of man's definition of the God he glorifies. Or perhaps more simply, *civitas* is man's articulate glorification of God; -- of some God.

All men glorify God, though men differ as to who God is. And man's answer to the question who God is, is not merely verbal; the deliberate definition of God in a single proposition is only a small item. Man answers the question by the whole life of the kingdom of which he is a citizen. To say who God is, is with man's whole world including also nature and culture to choose for that God's kingdom; is with man's whole world to serve in the *civitas* dedicated to praise of that God. As man is constituted, to define God and in that God's kingdom to glorify Him are inseparable; to be as man is through all the capacities and media at man's disposal systematically to express who God is. Such concrete articulation in human life of a definition of God is a *civitas*, is

a kingdom. Citizenship in some *civitas* is as inescapable for man, also for contemporary man, as is the will to culture; and this is true, essentially, because no man can escape God.

To the contemporary mind these statements in their universal application will seem abstract, and in their abstractness perhaps presumptuous. But as the unyielding Protestant was asked to postpone final statement till contemporary mind had briefly expounded its position, so now let contemporary mind in turn postpone judgment till after the Protestant briefly sketches the concrete *civitas* of Christianity; the *civitas* which he believes articulates in human life the Biblical answer to the question who God is; which he believes is founded by God Himself ; and the constitution of which he believes is that same Biblical revelation. Indeed, it is because the unyielding Protestant believes that this kingdom is inseparable from the self-definition of the living and only true God that he refuses to yield on the concept.

Basic to Civitas Dei is Reality of God as God

First, then, God is real, and is first reality. God is not an ideal in man's head; not a projection of man's virtues; not a product of man's cultural will.

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He is not dependent on anything; all things are dependent, even for their being, on Him. God is God.

And of God as Creator

For there is also being besides. And there can be other reality, not identical with God, wholly dependent on Him, in no wise limiting Him, and nevertheless real -- an impossibility in the pagan perspective -- because God is Creator. Nature is such created being; being in which God expresses something of Himself, being which is real, and yet is in no sense God. And man is also such created, being; real, and even created in His image, and yet in no sense God.

Contemporary Definition of Human Nature Inadequate

Man differs from nature, true enough, in the fact that he knows forms or system both in and beyond nature, and in that he has a will to culture and is capable of rich product which the contemporary mind describes; is capable of not only bridges and tunnels but also language and science and government and art and morals. But endowment with intelligence and culture capacity does not yet exhaust the Biblical meaning of man's creation in the image of God. For this latter means also, and here preeminently, that man is a finite image of the glory of the self-revealing God.

The Glory of the Self-Defining God not that of Other Gods

All Gods, so to speak, demand human service and are glorified by it. But the Biblical answer to the question who God is sets God infinitely above all other Gods also in the nature of His glorification and glory. God, needing nothing, incapable of enrichment, created man to glorify Him. And, indeed, man was to glorify Him by using nature and by willing culture in order therein and therewith to express his awareness and his worshipful praise of the perfections of God. But so much is not yet all. The God of Biblical revelation is so far beyond all Gods and all thoughts of men that He is glorified by such total service in that through such service man becomes ever more capable of enjoying further revelations by God of His glory; God is glorified by men to whom He can increasingly reveal His own perfections. God is a God who glories in sharing His glory with man, so far as creature may. He is a God whose glory is his unspeakable love; and whose love is his unspeakable glory.

Civitas Dei Crowning Aspect of Image of God

Human society organized with such purpose and patterned thereby; the glorification of God the key to its never ending history; taught by God Himself, and with the prospect of education without end since God is inexhaustible; and though creature progresses infinitely, it is eternally creature; nothing human alien to it, and all gladly made subject to the law of

God; such is the *civitas dei* of which man was created to be citizen. A city of God because its founder and maker is God; the very residence of His

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glory; a city in which each is indispensable, and the city indispensable to each; a city in which there is no master but God, and yet each is served by all; a city glorifying this one God whose glory it is to impart His perfections to the city; for citizenship in such a divine city was man created. And capacity not simply for knowing system and for willing culture, but for such citizenship belongs to the image of God in which He created man.

Sin and the Civitas

Had man not fallen into sin, the justification of his cultural activity, of his very existence as human, would have been the *civitas* that glorified man's Maker. But mankind fell.

Man's sin meant not that he denied nature, nor the will to culture, nor even the need for justification of himself and his culture. Sin meant that man denied his Creator; that he was unwilling to accept God's self-definition. It means that man chose to glorify a strange God; that he chose to share in the perfections of, and to be patterned after, another than the God who deserves all praise and reverence. It means that he sought justification in a rival *civitas*.

Though man after his fall retained the form of humanness, having retained some capacity for knowing system, for willing culture, and for articulating his appreciation of what ought to be; having retained something even of his sense of needing justification for his human existence and activity, and consciously or unconsciously seeking such justification in his allegiance to a *civitas*; having retained his conviction of the existence of an eternal power and godhead; sin means nonetheless that man is estranged from the true and living God; and hence estranged from the essence of human life, which is life with Him in His city. Alien to the *civitas dei*, man would now need justification before entering the city as citizen of which alone he and his

works are justifiable; nor now can he will to enter it and eat of the tree of life. He is not alive; with sin man died.

Redemption and the Civitas Dei

But man's sin is not the frustration of God's plan for His creation. The kingdom was not lost; creation was no failure. The love and power and glory of God were not exhausted. Revealed anew in the incarnate Son of God, in the atoning passion and death and resurrection of Christ Jesus, the love God bears for the world reopens the possibility of man's entrance into the *civitas dei*. Created anew, made a new mankind by the regenerating and forgiving power of God, they who are by faith united with Christ are adopted as citizens of the Kingdom of God, of the Kingdom which the Father has given to the Son. The elect are elect to the kingdom. They are saved not simply as individuals, but as citizens of the kingdom, and for citizenship. And, therefore, salvation can be and is salvation not of part of man, but of the whole; salvation of man as he was created man; salvation of soul and body; salvation of man as cultural will; salvation of man as a creature

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intended for progressive deepening in knowledge and love of the God of all glory, by continuously dedicating himself and his world to Him. Nothing human is lost.

The Civitas Dei is Real

In this kingdom of which our Savior Christ Jesus is Lord, nothing of the *civitas dei* intended at creation is lost; rather, it is even the richer for the love of God revealed toward sinners. And this kingdom is real, is objective. It is not a utopia; not a city of nowhere. It is not a collection of ideas, ideals, wishes, imaginings, in the mind of man. It is not even something that will be a reality only at some future time. Though its complete manifestation awaits the return of our Lord, His kingdom is real today as Christ is real; it is real as God the Holy Spirit is real, who is the loving power and the teacher of the kingdom; it is real as God the Father is real, who resurrected Christ Jesus and

set Him as Lord of the kingdom above all principalities and powers. It is real as the Church, its primary agent, is real. Too, it is real as created man and his culture are real; real as created nature is real; real as sin and its effects, unhappily, are real. To deny the reality of the *civitas dei*, one must be prepared also to deny that all these are real.

No Kingdom is Purely Subjective

And now, after this sketch of the Biblical background of the Protestant's concept of *civitas dei*, perhaps his notion of *civitas* in general may also have taken on more concreteness.

Till the return of our Lord shall do away with sin, the rival kingdoms, the *civitates* of strange gods, remain. Each such rival, too, is objective, but with a borrowed reality only. Each claims all of man; each bids for man's soul and all his world. Each demands that its citizens use all cultural activity and culture as language for expressing its spirit. Each shapes its citizens into the image of its strange god. Each is throughout an imitation of the *civitas dei*. Each is the articulation in human life of a definition of God. These rival religio-moral commonwealths are the worldly cities, the kingdoms of the world.

Civitas and Culture

The *civitas*, any *civitas*, cannot be identified with cultural product, nor with the will to culture, nor with cultural activity. But on the other hand, the *civitas* lives and is realized therein. It is realized in and by eating and drinking, cobbling and carpentry, work and play, science and education, law and government, love and worship; nothing human but enters into the city. The *civitas* is not one, or some, nor even all the objects, tangible and intangible, which man produces or assimilates, but is the city that is objectified in the producing and assimilating of the cultural objects. Only as citizen of a *civitas* does man achieve at least formal freedom with reference to his own cultural activity and product, does he achieve the moral maturity of

humanness; and the *civitas* of which he is a citizen assimilates, uses, creates cultural product so as to make possible his life as citizen, as man.

Civitas and Nature of Morality and Freedom

The *civitas* patterns the man. It shapes man as he engages in assimilating and shaping cultural products; it shapes man as he engages in living. The only voice man has in his shaping is in choosing which *civitas* shall shape him. And this means that deeply man's freedom lies only in answering the question who God is. The essence of moral choice is this choice between kingdoms, for by this choice the agent defines morality itself. Man (and similarly the individual) is inescapably related to nature; he is also inescapably a being who wills culture. Inescapably, too, he chooses some justifying kingdom. But in his choice between kingdoms he acquires the stature of moral will, or responsible freedom, of personality; and this remains no less true though a right choice is now made possible only by wholly unmerited redemptive divine grace. But since the choice is choice of a *civitas*, the choice is continuous, is one which is dynamic, which is always rooting itself in all the activities of the chosen city; it is choice of a living comprehensive citizenship.

Civitas and Nature of Religion

And so the essence of all choices, the essence of moral choice, is religious decision. The *civitas* chosen is the continuous living expression of a man's religious faith; it is his answer, writ in large letters, to the question who God is. As religious decision, the choice is not one among other "moral" choices, but rather definitive of morality itself. This is not to say that the choice between, for example, honesty and dishonesty is in no sense a moral choice; it is rather to say that the choice between these two is not the basic or morally definitive choice. Decision in favor of honesty will be recommended by all the kingdoms between which one makes his basic choice. The real issue is that of the city within which honesty takes its organic place. It is this choice of *civitas* which is the real issue of moral decision; not as though it is separate and abstracted from all man's day-to-day decisions, but just because it is the

essence of all. Thus, all cultural activity, all assimilation and production of art, science, government, "morality," as well as all industry, commerce, and business -- all this is on the one hand education and production of the citizen of (whichever) kingdom; and is on the other hand, and at the same time, his expression of, his proof of, his witness to, his citizenship. Profoundly, therefore, morality is not separable from religion.

Contrariwise, religion, true or false, though it is indeed intimate and is the very essence of personality, is not something merely private, nor something limited to what is usually meant by personal life. Nor is religion restricted to individual and public prayer and worship; nor is it absent when these in the conventional sense are absent. Religion always involves citizenship in some comprehensive *civitas*.

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Civitas and Education

And what is true of all cultural activity is *a fortiori* true of that part of cultural activity which we call formal education, education in the schools. It expresses and presupposes religious decision, articulates the meaning and structure of a chosen *civitas*, also when it professes neutrality; and inseparably in the same process forms, molds, educates the citizen in the meaning and structure of (whichever) *civitas*. Not only professedly Christian, but all formal education, like all cultural activity, is both expression of and education in religious decision or religious faith; a faith objectified in a kingdom. Education is by a kingdom and for citizenship in that kingdom.

IV

Sense in Which Purpose of Whole Civitas Dei is Education

In a profound sense, the whole purpose of the *civitas dei*, of the kingdom of God, is education; and education attends all the activities of the citizen, however old he may be. In his thinking and doing, and by means of his

products, the citizen is being educated in richer glorification of God; and his teacher is God, through His Word and Spirit. The city realizes the glorification of God in order to make such glorification by the citizens possible. The exercise of mankind's capacities for knowing and for cultural willing are not, as contemporary mind takes them, intrinsic ends, and adequately definitive of man; their real value lies in their indispensability for exercising mankind's capacity for glorifying God. And thus, in the city of God, culture receives its value from the fact that it is necessary for Christian articulation of the definition of the self-revealing God.

Central Aim of Formal Education in Civitas Dei

Formal education in the kingdom, while only one aspect of its total life, reflects the whole structure and meaning of the kingdom, carries over the intent and general organization of the *civitas*. The heart of formal education lies not in the developing of skill at handling and modifying nature, though such development is also instrumental to the *civitas*; nor yet in the expanding of the content to which human knowledge of system is applied -- in the productive willing of culture -- though such expansion is indispensable; nor yet in the expansion of the pupil's systematic knowledge of the cultural product as it comes down from the past, though this, too, is indispensable. The heart of education lies in the maturing, by all this, of his insight into the meaning and structure of the city as glorifying God, and in the deepening of his allegiance to it. A formal education which, though it might have acquainted the student with culture, had not, and in the process, made correspondingly more meaningful and contentful God's self-definition, would have failed to be Christian.

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Formal Education and Kingdom of Modernity

This general pattern of the relation between formal schooling and the *civitas dei* is imitated in every worldly *civitas* as well. In every worldly kingdom, too, the heart of formal schooling lies in maturing the citizen's insight into the meaning and pattern of the kingdom and in deepening his loyalty to it; lies in

increasing his ability and desire through the kingdom to articulate who the God is of this kingdom.

Take the *civitas* of modernity -- the kingdom which has been concretizing itself ever since the Renaissance -- a *civitas* which Abraham Kuyper rightly discerns as "revolutionary" and anti-Christian.

Along with pagan idealism and perennial naturalism, this *civitas* is one of the major kingdoms which have concretized themselves in Occidental culture, and which today are living rivals of the *civitas dei*. The term modernity, as applying to this antithetical kingdom, is not to be taken in its merely chronological sense; it is not synonymous with such things as industrialization or the appearance of labor unions and cartels or advance in scientific discovery; it is not this or that, though both this and that may serve as its implement -- may be patterned by it. Modernity is as *civitas* not defined simply as the recent; it is a matter of controlling genius, of defining commitments, of patterning dynamic, of religious decision and its articulation in life. One may live in the twentieth century and be a citizen of the *civitas dei*, or, for all that, of one of the other worldly kingdoms; and this despite the fact that the modernist likes to believe that chronological contemporaneity and citizenship in the *civitas* of modernity are one and the same.

General Structure of Kingdom of Modernity, and Meaning of Neutrality

In the kingdom of modernity, as has already been stated on an earlier page, man is different from the animal and all of nature in that he has capacity for knowing pure system and for culturally willing to modify nature to accord therewith. In the kingdom of modernity, God is this pure system. Pure system is objective; is not a creation of the subjective mind. It is eternal, self-existent, divine. It is Reason, but then not my individual reason; it is not to be defined psychologically. It is the objective, eternal, rational system in the knowing of which man becomes rational (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Marx; but no less presupposed by Hume or Dewey). And this God is glorified by man as man wills that this system shall prevail, as man wills to incarnate it in nature and in mankind, as man progressively wills culture. The system does not glorify itself; man by spontaneously creating the will to make

system the ruler of his life glorifies system. And thus science becomes the aegis of cultural activity. In the name of system, the kingdom of modernity passes judgment on, assesses, all of nature and all of historical culture. It will, for example, accept as much of Christianity as passes through this net of system or science. Its "neutrality" consists in

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its commitment to system as divine ultimate; and it follows that the kingdom of modernity can profess to be quite tolerant of private beliefs, however irrational, if only they be scientifically recognized as private speculation. In this being bound by nothing but neutral, indifferent, scientific system, in this self-created willing to glorify the God of modernity, lies freedom. And freedom is the touchstone of all value. Not, freedom is good, but, the good is freedom. Not, the system is good, but, willing the system is good; for only at the birth of man's will does value come into being.

Formal education in the kingdom of modernity reflects the organization and intent of the kingdom. Educational use in this *civitas* of such terms as neutrality, freedom, scientific, reason, liberal education, or their equivalents, is loaded, as it is in any kingdom.

Ambiguity of the Term Modern

The fact that the terms are used prejudicially by modern educators is often, and not necessarily deliberately, concealed under the ambiguity of the term modern. Thus, the passage of time is presumed to have simply outmoded the classic Christian idea that education involves kingdoms and their clash. It will be conceded that until recently Occidental education was indeed in the service of one or another *civitas*, and thus that there may have been at one time or another in the past good reason for insisting on Christian institutions of higher education. But it will be maintained that chronological modernity has brought with itself the possibility of an education which is neutral and can serve all men. It will be conceded that a few centuries were needed to effect the transition from the medieval outlook; in America it took till within the memory of men still living to rid education of the old leaven; but it will

be maintained that the passage of time has finally brought us to the realization that education can be neutral.

Neutral Education Proposed as True Heir of Reformation

And whether or not we have as yet fully caught up with history, is not such neutrality in education ideal? Indeed, ought not the unyielding Protestant be first to proclaim its desirability? For if, as on his standpoint he holds, the religious issue or the choice between kingdoms or the question who God is is for every man the most important of all, ought we not just because this issue is all important make certain that the individual can freely decide between the alternatives? Is it fair, is it morally right, is it Protestant, is it consistent with Reformation insistence on the office of the believer and on the dignity of the individual, to prejudge the issue for the pupil? How shall his choice be rational, be free, when he is simply indoctrinated in the Christian (or any other) *civitas*? In the interest exactly of a free, an intelligent, and mature decision between the rival kingdoms or against all of them, should we not provide the student with an education which acquaints him with all of culture scientifically, objectively, neutrally,

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so that not having been committed to any his choice may then be free, and therefore good?

But Actually Reflects Civitas of Modernity

Professing to be committed to no *civitas*, deciding all matters and also the issue between kingdoms in the name of pure neutral system, and defining freedom as the loyal willing of nothing but pure system, such formal education exactly reflects the pattern and meaning of the *civitas* of modernity. Such education does not reflect the kingdom of pagan idealism; it would have horrified Plato, for example. Nor yet does it reflect the kingdom of perennial naturalism. And, despite its argument, it reflects quite the opposite of the kingdom of Christianity, also Protestant. Such education expresses the genius of a new kingdom among the rivals, the kingdom of Renaissance Modernity.

No Formal Education but Reflects a Kingdom

All formal education, then, even such as professes to be neutral, reflects some *civitas*. That it cannot escape doing so is but a phase of the fact that man cannot escape answering the question who God is, and articulating the answer in life; that is to say, cannot escape religious decision and allegiance to some kingdom. In his decision, man defines goodness and rationality; religious decision can, therefore, not be called irrational except in the name of prior religious decision; for example, a prior religious decision in favor of modernity. Only by religious faith can one say that man's capacity for knowing system and for willing culture defines his humanness. Indeed, in the very saying itself one has already found the heart of man's humanness in something beyond both his knowing of system and his willing of culture -- namely, in man's capacity for glorifying God, whether the true or the false. True, man is inescapably a knower of system and a producer of culture; but this means that his definition of God, his religious faith, inescapably articulates itself in a kingdom. The difference between Christian and non-Christian education is, therefore, not that religious faith is present in the one and not in the other; the difference is between the Christian definition of God and a non-Christian definition; and is thus a difference and opposition between kingdoms.

Complexity of Existing Cultural Product

And this religio-moral difference between kingdoms is the more important educationally just because the cultural product at any given time is a complex resultant. There is that in it which is inescapable for any *civitas*, and there is that in it which embodies the genius of each of the several kingdoms.

Thus, nature enters into cultural product. Already as such it lays down conditions for the concretization of any kingdom whatever; of whatever kingdom man is a citizen he must eat, for example. But existentially the nature we encounter is always a nature that has already been modified by cultural

will in the past; a nature that exists not as abstract, but as entering into an existing economic system or an existing poem.

And the objective pure system, by "immanent" apprehension of which human knowing is differentiated, also lays down inescapable conditions for the realization of any kingdom whatever; thus, science or literature will in any kingdom have to embody certain laws or system. But, as articulate, the system is known and discoverable at any time only as interwoven with cultural stuff in the cultural product; literary norms, for example, cannot be known and appreciated articulately apart from the dramas of Aeschylus, the poetry of Goethe and Keats, the novels of Hardy, etc.

And the will to culture, common to all men, also lays down conditions for every kingdom; culture can never stand still, for instance. But at any time it itself is conditioned by the cultural product, by its own past, by history.

And the inescapability of glorifying God, some God, also lays down a condition; always in the totality of his cultural activity man is active as citizen of some kingdom, is glorifying some God, is articulating some definition of God; that is to say, something of the dynamic and pattern of his *civitas* enters into the cultural product. But the kingdom of God has its rivals, and has had them since the Fall; and something of the dynamic and pattern of all enters into, is concretized in, the culture transmitted by history.

Christian Education Requires Progressive Discrimination of Concrete Antithesis Between Kingdom of God and Rivals

The existing cultural product, then, has been shaped by factors which condition all culture. It also embodies something of the historical dynamic and pattern of the kingdom of God. But pre-eminently it also embodies the sinful kingdoms of the world. As an interwoven complex resultant of all these conditions and forces and religions, the present cultural milieu has issued from history; the existing roads and canals, the alphabet, the grammar, the currency system, the literature, the governments, the schools, the temples, the science, the weapons, the debts, the trends and drives, the meanings of terms -- all such in their interwoven totality make the cultural product of the

present. Nor apart therefrom is there selfhood; the sin in culture is not sin for which the individual can disclaim responsibility. But, likewise, apart therefrom there is no citizenship in a kingdom; apart therefrom there is no articulating of the definition of God. And thus the citizen of the kingdom of God, his selfhood tied in with the existing culture, if in his daily living he is to express his faith, must learn how in terms of the historical cultural product of his day to distinguish the *civitas dei* from the other kingdoms. In other words, in order meaningfully and concretely to articulate the *civitas dei*, its citizen must learn to distinguish it from the other kingdoms as they, too, are culturally articulated; he must learn in and by means of the cultural product as this has come down to the present to discriminate

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between the kingdom of God and the worldly kingdoms. Add, now, the sinfulness still attaching to the citizen himself, and the difficulty as well as the significance of Christian education are obvious. But something, at least, of the definition of education by and for citizens of the kingdom of God also becomes apparent. [NOTE 4]

All formal education will systematically acquaint the pupil with what is. All formal education will develop certain skills. All formal education will educate the pupil on his level in a major body of given subject matter (arithmetic, history, geography, etc.). All formal education will make an appeal to and stimulate the pupil's will to culture. But in the process of formal education, taken in its totality at any moment, the pupil will also inevitably be expressing and learning to express the pattern of some *civitas*. In Christian education, this *civitas* is the *civitas dei*, and in its concrete antithesis to the kingdom of the world in its major forms. [NOTE 5]

Higher Education Necessary to Civitas Dei

If the gospel of salvation, simple enough to be grasped by the untutored mind, is to mean the glorification of our Lord in all of life, then Christianity will demand Christian higher education. If the Bible, which is the constitution of the *civitas dei*, is to be known and valued by the citizens of

this kingdom as indeed the self-revelation of God, then Christianity will demand Christian higher education. For the *civitas dei* such Christian education is not a gratuitous ornament, but a necessity. And such Christian education (at whatever level) is impossible unless there be formal provision somewhere for always maintaining a company of loyal and capable citizens of the kingdom who make it their business to lead the way in the matter of scholarly discrimination between the *civitas dei* as concretely articulated and projectible culturally and the kingdoms of the world, also as these are concretely articulated culturally.

A Christian college is a necessity, therefore, not because every citizen of the *civitas dei* should go to college, nor even only because those who should go to colleges are as individuals entitled to a Christian education, but because as kingdom the *civitas dei* needs it; needs a college in the warfare with the kingdoms of the world; needs a college in order to articulate meaningfully the true answer to the question who God is. [NOTE 6]

NOTE 4

Discussion of the concrete application of the definition to curriculum and teaching in an institution of Christian education is beyond the confines of the present paper. The major rivals of the *civitas dei*, all of them kingdoms of the world, which have a large measure of embodiment in the existing culture of the Occident have already been suggested.

NOTE 5

The Christian college is in no dilemma such as contemporary mind wishes to force on it except the Christian college itself loses sight of the *civitas dei* and its significance for education.

NOTE 6

No Bible Institute, for example, however desirable and necessary, can substitute for it And the same applies to denominational foundations, etc., which would add religion at state universities.

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Christian Action in Realm of Higher Education Means a Christian University

There should be added one practical corollary of its major thesis that if the *civitas dei* engages in any formal education at all, it cannot do without a university in the stricter sense of the term. In the stricter sense, a university is not made by being authorized to grant advanced degrees, nor even by having post-graduate students. Rather, it is in essence a company of scholar-citizens who have capacity for concretely discriminating the kingdoms, and are given the leisure and equipment to exercise this capacity. If in very truth Christ is to be "laid in the bottom" of education at any level, then the Christian university in the stricter sense is presupposed. Contemporary American Protestantism which meets the challenge to Christian action in the realm of higher education by maintaining the professedly Christian college should recognize that to reflect and serve the *civitas dei* its college must actually be a university in the sense defined and devoted to articulating the city of God. Else American Protestantism will find itself unable to define Christian education even within its own institutions except in the anemic terms it must employ when defining its promotion at a state university. **[END]**

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